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Economics of Salary Dispersion in the National Basketball Association
Abstract
In the business world, every firm faces salary allocation decisions. Managers and executives of companies have
to ask themselves how to allocate salaries across positions. This question also applies to teams within the
National Basketball Association (NBA). NBA players provide a differing amount of value to their respective
team and therefore are worth different amounts of money in comparison to one another. General managers
have to decide which players to sign as well as figure allocation decisions of the salary they distribute to their
signed players. An important research question to consider is: What is the best way to allocate salary amongst
a NBA team? The term “best” in this situation can be interpreted in different ways. First, “best” can be viewed
as a salary distribution that maximizes wins. Wins are obviously important to fans and are also important to
management. In addition to win maximizing, “best” can also be viewed as a salary distribution that maximizes
revenue as each team is attempting to make money.
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ECONOMICS OF SALARY DISPERSION IN THE 
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
Dan Schouten
I. INTRODUCTION
 In the business world, every firm faces sala-
ry allocation decisions.  Managers and executives 
of companies have to ask themselves how to al-
locate salaries across positions.  This question also 
applies to teams within the National Basketball 
Association (NBA).  NBA players provide a differ-
ing amount of value to their respective team and 
therefore are worth different amounts of money 
in comparison to one another.  General manag-
ers have to decide which players to sign as well 
as figure allocation decisions of the salary they 
distribute to their signed players.  An important 
research question to consider is: What is the best 
way to allocate salary amongst a NBA team?  The 
term “best” in this situation can be interpreted in 
different ways.  First, “best” can be viewed as a 
salary distribution that maximizes wins.  Wins are 
obviously important to fans and are also impor-
tant to management.  In addition to win maximiz-
ing, “best” can also be viewed as a salary distri-
bution that maximizes revenue as each team is 
attempting to make money.
 There are many reasons as to why this re-
search question is important, both in terms of the 
NBA and other businesses.  With regards to the 
NBA, the answer to this question could play a sig-
nificant role in the shaping of the league.  Gen-
eral managers will hopefully be able to construct 
their teams better and more appropriately after 
this study and also be able to understand how the 
distribution of the salaries that they give out will af-
fect their goals for the season.  
 With general managers’ knowledge of 
team construction increasing, the competitive 
balance of the NBA might also be able to in-
crease.  The biggest problem any sports league 
faces is competitive imbalance.  A large amount 
of imbalance can lead to a contraction in the 
number of teams, or even the disbanding of the 
entire league (Rosen et al, 2000).  The NBA has the 
biggest competitive imbalance problem of any 
of the four major sports leagues when it comes to 
number of wins and amount of revenue generat-
ed.  As of the end of the 2010-11 NBA season, two 
teams, the Boston Celtics and Los Angeles Lakers, 
have won a combined 33 NBA Championships in 
the 65 year existence of the NBA.  In addition to 
this fact, differences across teams in the amount 
of revenue generated are enormous.  Within the 
last five years, there has been up to a 254% differ-
ence between the top and bottom teams in total 
revenue.  The competitive imbalance problem 
deals with a problem at the league level, where-
as the research question at hand deals with the 
team level disparity.  They are connected, how-
ever, because if salary dispersion on a team level 
affects wins and revenues, general managers 
would be able to use this knowledge and create 
their teams to be more competitive against the 
rest of the league.  This would increase the health 
of the league and therefore everyone involved 
with the NBA would reap the benefits.
 In addition to these facts on the impor-
tance of this topic in the NBA, this research can 
also be extremely beneficial to other firms, com-
panies and industries.  The research done dur-
ing this study can possibly expose a new system 
of managing and a new way to organize firms, 
similar to the way the book Moneyball by Michael 
Lewis changed perceptions throughout the busi-
ness world.  Every firm faces salary allocation de-
cisions, but the fact that outcomes are more eas-
ily measured in sports than in other business firms 
makes studying research topics such as this one 
easier to complete when applying it to a sports 
organization.  Basketball players’ productivity is 
much more easily measured than workers in other 
firms because of the statistics that are compiled 
with the sport.  
 This study aims to determine the optimal 
amounts of salary dispersion to maximize wins and 
maximize revenue.  Based on economic theory 
provided in the following section, I hypothesize 
that the optimal amount of salary dispersion will be 
different for teams that have a goal of maximizing 
wins and teams that have a goal of maximizing 
revenue.  In addition, the theory in the following 
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section also helps generate other hypotheses.  In 
terms of win maximization, I hypothesize that the 
greater the dispersion the greater the number of 
wins achieved.  In terms of revenue maximization, 
I also hypothesize that the greater the dispersion, 
the greater the amount of revenue generated. 
However, I believe the effect of dispersion will be 
greater for revenue.
II. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
 There has been a large amount of litera-
ture on topics related to this research question 
pertaining to wage disparities within a firm, but 
not a great amount done specifically on salary 
dispersion in the NBA and its effects.  The major-
ity of the literature that is similar to this topic deals 
with the effect of salary dispersion on the number 
of wins and does not even consider revenue.  The 
literature that deals with wins and salary dispersion 
is relatively new (Berri et al, 2004).  This is a result of 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) be-
tween the NBA owners and players’ union that 
was developed at the start of the 1995 NBA sea-
son.  This was the first time in NBA history where 
the salary dispersion within teams really exploded. 
The “middle-class” of the NBA was basically lost 
and teams had very high salary players and low 
salary players (Berri et al, 2004).  Many teams, as a 
result of the terms of the new CBA, took the path 
of devoting a substantial amount of team payroll 
to a few stars and then complete their roster with 
players offered the NBA minimum wage or close 
to it.  
 David Berri and Todd Jewell (2004) saw 
this rapid change in distribution of salaries as a 
chance for a natural experiment to understand 
how changes in disparity impact team/firm per-
formance.  Hajime Katayama and Hudan Nuch 
(2011) completed a similar study.  Each study 
defined the dispersion variable differently, but 
both came to the same conclusions.  Both studies 
found the amount of salary dispersion among a 
team to have no significant effect on team per-
formance.  The authors say that, for this industry 
at least, the idea of tournament theory, which 
states that pay inequality results in higher work-
er productivity, and pay compression school of 
thought, which states that wage equality will en-
hance cooperation and therefore performance, 
are both inapplicable (Berri et al, 2004).  The da-
tasets used, however, were admittedly somewhat 
small and both Berri and Katayama believe there 
could be a significant effect if the sample size was 
larger (Kayama et al, 2011).  Another similarity of 
these authors was their conclusion that salary dis-
persion might not affect team performance be-
cause the lower salaried players will perform to 
their best abilities to maximize the amount of sal-
ary they can obtain on their next contract.
 Stefan Kesenne (2007) discusses the mul-
tiple objectives of professional sports teams in his 
book The Economic Theory of Professional Team 
Sports.  He acknowledges that professional sports 
organizations are businesses that attempt to max-
imize revenue and profit, but at the same time 
many teams are focused on maximizing wins. 
Studies have been shown to be inconclusive in 
accepting or rejecting the profit or win maximiza-
tion goals.  Kesenne provides a simple diagram 
that leads to the underlying hypothesis of this pa-
per, which is that revenue maximizing teams and 
win maximizing teams will have a differing amount 
of salary dispersion. Figure 1 shows the different 
amount of talent demand levels depending on 
team goals.  The number of talents, or superstars, 
is represented on the horizontal axis and total rev-
enue and cost is represented on the vertical axis. 
The variables t1, t2, etcetera, on the horizontal 
axis do not specifically mean one superstar, two 
superstars, and so forth.  They represent different 
possible number of talents on a team, but not in-
cremental increases in talents.  The farther to the 
right on the horizontal axis, the higher the total 
amount of talents on a team.  Total cost increases 
as the number of talents increases, but the rev-
enue curve is concave.  According to Kesenne, 
this is a result of revenue increasing with the team 
becoming more successful, but then decreasing 
if the team becomes too good and public inter-
est fades because of lack of uncertainty.  A reve-
nue maximizing team will hire at the t2 amount of 
talents on this graph, where the revenue curve is 
at its highest point.  Under the assumption that the 
more talents there are on a team, the team will 
be more talented overall, and therefore a more 
successful team, a win maximizing team would 
want to hire as many talents as financially pos-
sible.  Therefore, a win maximizing team will hire t4 
amount of talents on this graph, where they can 
maximize the amount of talents without losing any 
money (Kesenne, 2007).  This analysis makes clear 
that the revenue maximization point and win 
maximization point requires a different amount of 
talents and therefore a differing amount of salary 
dispersion.  
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 The effect of superstars on revenue has 
also been extensively studied.  Sherwin Rosen 
(1981) and Walter Oi (2008) have studied the 
economics of superstars.  Rosen discusses that the 
settings in which superstars are found share two 
common elements.  These are a close connec-
tion between personal reward and the size of a 
person’s own market, and a strong tendency for 
market size and reward to be skewed toward the 
most talented people in a specific activity.  Oi be-
lieves that superstars’ gigantic income and rare 
talents is what attracts attention.  They both ac-
knowledge that superstars are of interest to fans 
and therefore create attention.  In most circum-
stances superstars are considered entertaining 
and it is the search for entertainment, admira-
tion, and a desire to understand how they are as 
good as they are at what they do that creates 
the increase in revenue generated for their firm. 
Jerry Hausman and Gregory Leonard (1997) stud-
ied the effect that NBA superstars had on both 
team and league revenue during a number of 
seasons in the 1990’s.  Some of the avenues that 
superstars help produce revenues are through in-
creased television ratings, increased attendance 
at games, and an increase in sport paraphernalia 
sales.  They found that not only does a superstar 
positively impact his team’s total revenue, but 
he also positively impacts other teams’ revenue 
(Hausman et al, 1997).  This means that small mar-
ket teams would attempt to free-ride off large 
market teams.  According to Hausman, a sugges-
tion to fix this free rider benefit is the institution of a 
salary cap.  A salary cap, however, will over cor-
rect the superstar externality.  The NBA has tried 
to correct this problem by instituting a soft salary 
cap (Coon, 2011).  This means that there are a 
few exceptions to the salary cap rule and teams 
are able to have a payroll that exceeds the salary 
cap, but are fined when payrolls exceed a certain 
luxury tax level.  The luxury tax level is determined 
by a complicated formula, but is typically in the 
range of $12-13 million above the salary cap.  
 With Kesenne’s theory and the effects 
of superstars understood, the specific questions 
of win maximization and revenue maximization 
have to be dealt with.  Salary dispersion and the 
effect it has on teams can be explained within the 
framework of demand theory.  Marginal revenue 
product (MRP) is the underlying component of a 
demand for 
labor curve. 
Human capi-
tal theory 
is underly-
ing the MRP 
curve since 
human capi-
tal is directly 
related to 
the marginal 
p r o d u c t i v -
ity of workers. 
Human capi-
tal refers to the productive capabilities of human 
beings as income generating components in the 
economy (Rosen, 2008).  According to human 
capital theory, the higher the productivity that is 
obtained through investments in education and 
training, the higher amount of income a person 
should achieve.  Also, human capital theory sug-
gests that the returns to investments in education 
and training are directly related to the individu-
al’s innate 
ability and 
physical en-
d o w m e n t s . 
Therefore, the 
higher the 
b a s k e t b a l l 
player’s skill, 
the higher 
the amount 
of income he 
should gen-
erate and 
the higher his 
MRP.  
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 According to Oi (2008), small differences 
in talent can be associated with large differenc-
es in income, especially when the market size is 
big, which is definitely the case with the NBA.  This 
idea is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 3 shows 
that with increased training all players’ marginal 
product increases, but superstars’ marginal prod-
uct increases by a larger amount.  The same 
thing occurs in Figure 2 with marginal revenue 
product increasing with training, but superstars’ 
marginal revenue product increases by an even 
greater amount than it did with marginal product 
in comparison to the normal players.  This large 
difference in MRP allows superstars to earn a high 
income compared to normal players and could 
cause great salary dispersion within a team.  
 Teams, in essence, construct their own de-
mand curve and have different curves than other 
teams (Rosen et al, 2000).  With the knowledge 
of MRP of players and the presence of a salary 
cap, demand curves can be understood.  With 
a larger number of high skilled players, a large 
amount of the team’s total salary, which is limited 
as a result of the salary cap and luxury tax level, 
is devoted to a few players and therefore the de-
mand curve would be very steep and inelastic. 
Teams with more balanced salary dispersion will 
have a flatter, more elastic demand curve (Rosen 
et al, 2000).  This idea is represented in Figures 4 
and 5.  Figure 4 represents a MRP curve of a team 
that employs a few superstars and the rest below 
average players, therefore creating an uneven 
distribution of talent.  The superstars, as a result of 
their high skill level, require larger salaries.  Given 
the salary constraints a team faces, the rest of the 
team is filled with below average skill level play-
ers who only require smaller salaries.  This uneven 
distribution of talent, therefore, creates a large 
amount of salary dispersion and an inelastic MRP 
curve.  Figure 5 represents a MRP curve for a team 
with players of similar abilities.  As a result of the 
abilities of players being similar, the salary each 
player receives should be somewhat similar.  Cer-
tain players would still make more than others, but 
the overall salary dispersion for the team would 
be much less.  This more balanced distribution of 
talent, therefore, creates little salary dispersion 
and an elastic MRP curve. 
 Free agency in the NBA allows players to 
negotiate their contracts.  This enables the play-
er to have power over receiving their full worth. 
Teams have to bid for players and players can 
decide if they believe the offer is fair.  The poten-
tial producer surplus obtained by the team that 
signs the player is squeezed out by the player as a 
result of the ability to negotiate.  At the extreme, 
players receive their personal MRP and teams re-
ceive no producer surplus.  An interesting part to 
this is that teams offer salaries to players at what 
they believe the player’s future MRP will be.  The 
amount paid to each player in comparison to his 
true MRP will determine the amount of revenue 
each team brings in.  The decision process of 
whom to sign and for what price enables each 
team to create their own demand curve (Rosen 
et al, 2000).
Schouten
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 Kesenne’s theory of professional sports 
teams along with demand for labor theory sets 
the stage for the remainder of this research study. 
When looking into the effects of salary distribution 
amongst NBA teams, both of these theories are 
relevant.  
III. DATA
 Two different regressions are going to be 
utilized using cross-sectional data in order to de-
termine the best way to allocate salary amongst 
an NBA team.  This section discusses all the data 
that is needed to be obtained in order to carry 
out these regressions.  The next section specifically 
discusses the variables used in these regressions 
in terms of each variable’s definition, importance, 
and expected affect.  
 In the first regression, the Wins Regression, 
the number of wins a team achieved during the 
regular season is the dependent variable.  Only 
regular season wins, and not playoff wins, are be-
ing included in this study because every team 
participates in the same number of regular sea-
son games whereas not every team makes the 
playoffs.  Using only regular season wins allows the 
study to be more consistent and accurate.  This 
data is compiled from the NBA’s website (“NBA.
com”).  In the second regression, the Revenue 
Regression, the team’s total revenue of each sea-
son is the dependent variable.  Forbes publishes 
valuations and other reported money figures, 
such as revenue, of sports teams every year (The 
Business of Basketball, 2011).  The years of data 
for this study are from the seasons of 2006-07 to 
2010-2011.  The Wins Regression, which has wins 
as the dependent variable, uses all five seasons 
of data.  The Revenue Regression, which has rev-
enue as the dependent variable, uses only the 
first four seasons of data as a result of the NBA not 
reporting the 2010-11 season revenue figures until 
January 2012.  
 Total television market size in each NBA 
team’s metropolitan area needs to be account-
ed for as that could play a role in the revenue 
and possibly wins a team is able to generate.  This 
data is reported by Nielson Ratings, which is the 
most credible source when it comes to television 
monitoring (“Local Television Market Universe Es-
timates”).  One limitation to the Nielson Ratings, 
however, is that it only reports figures for cities 
in the United States.  The NBA is a multinational 
league with one team being located in Toronto, 
Canada.  The Bureau of Broadcast Measurement 
(BBM) is Canada’s equivalent of the United State’s 
Nielson Ratings.  The only year of data reported, 
during the range of this study, for Toronto’s tele-
vision market size was for the 2008-09 year.  The 
other four years of television market size data for 
Toronto are estimations based on Toronto’s popu-
lation.
 Another piece of data that is pertinent to 
this study is the luxury tax level in the NBA for each 
of the seasons.  These figures are widely reported 
but for this study the data is taken from the NBA’s 
website (“NBA.com”).  
 Finally, the last data that are needed are 
total team salaries to see if each given team is 
above or below the luxury tax level and a break-
down of team salaries by player in order to an-
alyze the amount of wage dispersion for each 
given team.  This data is reported by USAToday, 
which is a very reliable source for this type of data, 
however, there was a problem with some of the 
information retrieved from this source (“National 
Basketball Association Salaries”).  When analyzing 
the salary data of the 2009-10 Houston Rockets, it 
was evident that the database double counted 
one player.  Yao Ming, a player on the Houston 
Rockets, was included twice, and therefore, that 
needed to be corrected.  The false Yao Ming was 
removed in order to make the study more accu-
rate.  Another shortcoming from this source was 
that it did not include the 2006-07 and 2007-08 
Seattle Supersonics in its database.  The Seattle 
Supersonics relocated to Oklahoma City after the 
2007-08 season and therefore became Oklaho-
ma City in the database. The salary figures for the 
two years of data in this study where Seattle did 
have an NBA team comes from the NBA’s website 
(“NBA.com”).   
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL
A. Dependent Variable
 In this study, OLS regressions will be used to 
analyze the effect salary dispersion has on team 
performance and revenue.  The dependent vari-
able changes from the Wins Regression to the Rev-
enue Regression.  In the Wins Regression, number 
of wins a team achieved during the regular sea-
son will be the dependent variable, where in the 
Revenue Regression the total revenue generated 
Schouten
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by a team will be 
the dependent 
variable.
B. Explanatory 
Variables
 The ex-
planatory vari-
ables remain the 
same in both 
models.  Table 1 
provides a short 
e x p l a n a t i o n 
about each vari-
able and also re-
ports descriptive 
statistics of each 
variable.  Despite 
the fact that this 
study is attempt-
ing to find the 
“best” amount of 
salary dispersion 
for an NBA team, 
other variables 
must be included 
in this model to 
control for other 
circumstances.
 The most 
important vari-
able to this study 
is the wage dis-
persion factor. 
This variable is 
defined as the 
summation of sal-
ary of the top three paid players on an NBA team 
divided by the summation of salary of the next 
nine highest paid players.  Twelve players are be-
ing taken into account for each team because 
it is a requirement in the NBA that a team has at 
least 12 signed players at a time.  There are many 
more players that are signed to teams through-
out a season, but they normally are signed for 10-
day or 1-month contracts and therefore would be 
outliers in this study.  This definition of dispersion 
is different than every other study reviewed that 
was designed to test the effect salary dispersion 
has on performance and revenue.  At the same 
time, however, it is a definition that completely 
takes into account the salary of superstars and is 
a good representative measure of the dispersion 
factor that exists on a team.  As mentioned previ-
ously, the predicted effect of the dispersion factor 
is positive for both number of wins and amount of 
revenue.
 Another variable to be tested is the disper-
sion factor squared variable.  The value of this is 
simply the square of the dispersion factor.  This is 
used in the empirical model to attempt to see if 
there is a parabolic curvature to the effect dis-
persion has on both wins and revenue.  If there 
is, the maximum point on that curve would rep-
resent the “best” amount of dispersion for wins or 
revenue respectively.  The predicted sign of this 
variable is negative, which would create a con-
cave curve and, therefore, a maximum point rep-
resenting the “best” possible dispersion level.
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Table 1: Explanation and Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Definition Minimum Maximum Mean St. Dev.
Dependent
Variables
Model A
Wins Number of Regular Season 
Wins per NBA Team
12.00 67.00 41.00 12.89
Model B
Revenue Total Revenue of NBA Team $81,000,000 $31,594,769
Explanatory
Variables
Models A & B
TVMarketSize Number of Homes with 
Television in Metropolitan 
Area of Each NBA Team’s 
Home City
566,960.00 7,515,330.00 1,822,547.28
DispersionFactor Average Salary of Top 3 
Highest Paid Players Di-
vided By Average Salary of 
Next 9 Highest Paid Players
0.52436 3.60562 1.25268 0.47619
DispersionFactor2 Square of DispersionFactor 0.27496 13.00046 1.79445 1.71732
LuxuryTaxAbove A Team With Total Salary 
That is Above the Luxury 
Tax Level
0.00 1.00 0.39 0.49
LuxuryTaxBelow A Team With Total Salary 
That is Below the Luxury Tax 
Level
0.00 1.00 0.60 0.49
Fixed Effect 06-07 Team Competing in the 
2006-07 Season
0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40
Fixed Effect 07-08 Team Competing in the 
2007-08 Season
0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40
Fixed Effect 08-09 Team Competing in the 
2008-09 Season
0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40
Fixed Effect 09-10 Team Competing in the 
2009-10 Season
0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40
Fixed Effect 10-11 Team Competing in the 
2010-11 Season
0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40
The Park Place Economist, Volume XX
79
 The television market size is the next vari-
able.  This takes into account the number of 
homes with a television in the metropolitan area 
of each NBA teams’ home city.  It seems obvious 
that the size of a team’s market should have an 
impact on the amount of revenue generated 
throughout a season.  It is also plausible to sug-
gest that the market size could have an impact 
on wins as well considering the possibility of there 
being more money available from increased rev-
enue for big market teams.  There has historically 
been very little revenue sharing in the NBA, which 
makes the possibility of market size having an im-
pact on wins even greater (Dosh, 2001).  The mar-
ket size variable is predicted to contain a positive 
effect on both team wins and revenue.
 The next explanatory variable is a dummy 
variable that takes into account a team’s salary 
position relative to the luxury tax level.  The lux-
ury tax level is needed in comparison to the sal-
ary cap level.  This is because teams can have 
payrolls that exceed the salary cap due to cer-
tain league exceptions and are not punished for 
that, but are punished for exceeding the luxury 
tax level threshold.  As a result of this, most teams 
have a payroll that does exceed 
the salary cap, but a much small-
er portion of NBA teams have a 
payroll that exceeds the luxury 
tax level.  One of the variables in 
the model will be a dummy vari-
able representing if a team has 
a salary that is over the luxury tax 
threshold. The above luxury tax 
dummy variable, in this sense, is 
a good proxy for the level of a 
team’s payroll and is predicted 
to be positively correlated with 
wins and revenue.  If teams are 
spending enough money to have 
a payroll that exceeds the luxury 
tax level, they most likely have a 
number of superstars that should 
create more wins and revenue. 
 The last variables included 
in the empirical model are fixed 
effect variables for time.  These 
are included to deal with the pos-
sible omitted variable bias.  The 
goal of this variable is to control 
for things not already controlled 
for in the regression.  There might 
be some reason why revenue or wins are affect-
ed by omitted variables that are related to time. 
These variables will be dummy variables for each 
year except for 2010-11 in the Wins Regression and 
2009-10 in the Revenue Regression which are the 
reference years for each respective regression. 
Each of the five seasons has its own fixed effect 
for time dummy variable associated with it.  There 
is no logical predicted relationship of the fixed ef-
fect variable for time on both wins and revenue. 
Wins Regression: Wins = ß0+ ß1(MRKT) + 
ß2(LXTABOVE) + ß3(DISP) + ß4(DISP2)+ ß5(FE06-07) + 
ß6(FE07-08) + ß7(FE08-09)+ ß8(FE09-10) + µ
Revenue Regression: Revenue = ß0 + ß1(MRKT) + 
ß2(LXTABOVE) + ß3(DISP)  + ß4(DISP2)+ ß5(FE06-07) 
+ ß6(FE07-08) + ß7(FE08-09) + µ
V. RESULTS
 The results proceed in two separate sec-
tions.  The first presents the results of the Wins 
Regression and the effect dispersion has on the 
number of wins a team achieves, and the second 
deals with the results of the Revenue Regression 
and the effect dispersion has on the amount of 
Schouten
Table 2: Regression Results Predicting Wins
 Wins Regression
 Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable Wins Wins
Constant 24.475 / (3.914)*** 32.436 / (9.695)***
Dispersion Factor 16.833 / (2.212)** 7.693 / (3.793)***
Dispersion Factor2 -2.624 / (-1.246) -
Market -1.690E-6 / 
(-3.206)***
-1.701E-6 / 
(-3.223)**
LuxuryTaxAboveDummy 10.485 / (4.917)*** 10.566 / (4.947)***
Fixed Effect 06-07 0.342 / (.116) .235 / (.079)
Fixed Effect 07-08 -0.901 / (-.304) -1.095 / (-.369)
Fixed Effect 08-09 -0.135 / (-.045) -.577 / (-.195)
Fixed Effect 09-10 -4.774 / (-1.499) -5.148 / (-1.620)
Fixed Effect 10-11 - -
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.212
F-Value 6.088 6.709
Sample Size 150 150
Note: Values in parantheses are absolute t-statistics.
         *** = significant at .01 level
         ** = significant at .05 level
         * = significant at .10 level
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revenue a team generates.
A. Wins Regression
 Two different regressions 
need to be completed in order to 
understand the effect salary disper-
sion within a team has on team wins. 
Table 2 presents the results of the two 
OLS regressions.
 In Model 1, all the explanatory 
variables are utilized.  The market size 
variable is the only variable to have 
an opposite effect than what was 
predicted.  This is a result that, at first, 
appears to have no logic.  After re-
viewing the data, however, a reason 
for the size of the market negatively 
affecting wins emerges.  A number of 
the big markets in the United States 
have two NBA teams.  Both of these 
teams in each respective market 
technically, by reported figure stan-
dards, have the same market size.  In 
reality, however, one team most likely 
dominates the popularity within the 
market.  For example, the New York 
Knicks and New Jersey Nets share the same New 
York City metropolitan market.  The Knicks, how-
ever, are the much more popular team, while the 
Nets do not have nearly as many followers.  This, in 
effect, means the Nets really have a lower market 
size than would be reported by ratings systems. 
This effect is one possible explanation for the mar-
ket size negatively affecting the number of wins 
achieved by an NBA team.
 Every other variable behaves according 
to the presumed logic.  Only three of the vari-
ables included in the regression, however, are 
significant.  These are the market size, dispersion 
factor, and luxury tax above dummy variable. 
With the dispersion factor squared variable being 
insignificant, it is no longer possible to determine 
the exact “best” amount of salary dispersion for 
an NBA team.  This is because the dispersion fac-
tor squared variable is responsible for creating the 
parabolic shape to the curve, and, therefore, a 
max value of wins according to dispersion.  With 
dispersion factor squared being insignificant, the 
parabolic curve that it creates is insignificant and 
the “best” amount of dispersion/max number of 
wins point on the curve is not relevant.
 Model 2 uses every explanatory variable 
except for the dispersion factor squared.  This cre-
ates the curve to now be linear, in comparison to 
the parabolic curve from Model 1.  With a linear 
function, a specific “best” amount of dispersion 
cannot be interpreted, but instead, the “best” 
amount will occur at either zero dispersion or 
maximum dispersion, depending on whether the 
function is downward sloping or upward sloping. 
The market size is still the only variable to have the 
opposite effect of what was expected, and has a 
negative effect on number of wins, which is possi-
bly a result of the multiple teams in a single market 
problem discussed earlier.  
 The market size, dispersion factor, and 
luxury tax above dummy variable are all signifi-
cant, with market size being significant to the .05 
level and the other two being significant to the .01 
level.  Every fixed effect variable is shown to be 
insignificant to the model.  The fixed effect vari-
ables, while not being significant, still control for 
the possible omitted variable bias.  The negative 
effect of the market size is considerable.  For every 
1,000,000 people in a market, the regression states 
that an NBA team will lose another 1.7 games.  In 
more realistic win-loss terms, a team with a mean 
market size, which is 2,350,181 people, will lose an 
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Table 3: Regression Results Predicting Revenue 
 Revenue
Regression
 Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable Revenue Revenue
Constant 8.031E7 / (5.390)*** 8.551E7 / 
(10.448)***
Dispersion Factor 6.074E6 / (.342) -1.078E6 / (-.226)
Dispersion Factor2 -2.015E6 / (-.418) -
Market 6.752 / (5.2151)*** 6.753 / (5.235)***
LuxuryTaxAboveDummy 3.328E7 / (6.320)*** 3.334E7 / (6.356)***
Fixed Effect 06-07 1.234E7 / (1.702)* 1.255E7 / (1.741)*
Fixed Effect 07-08 1.305E7 / (1.891)* 1.320E7 / (1.921)*
Fixed Effect 08-09 1.487E7 / (2.141)** 1.482E7 / (2.142)**
Fixed Effect 09-10 - -
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.373
F-Value 10.914 12.798
Sample Size 120 120
Note: Values in parantheses are absolute t-statistics.
         *** = significant at .01 level
         ** = significant at .05 level
         * = significant at .10 level
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additional 4.00 games as a result of being in that 
market.  To put the amount of wins in perspective, 
each team only competes in 82 games in a sea-
son.  The luxury tax dummy variable also shows a 
sizeable relationship to a team with a total salary 
over the luxury tax level on wins compared to a 
team below the luxury tax level.  Teams that have 
a total salary above the luxury tax level will win an 
additional 10.556 games as a result of their high 
total salary.  The dispersion factor, the main focus 
and most important variable in this study, exhibits 
a smaller but still somewhat large effect on wins. 
An increase of one in the dispersion factor will 
lead to 7.693 more wins.
 With the results of Model 1 being insuffi-
cient to obtain a specific “best” amount of salary 
dispersion, Model 2 seems to be the best model 
to describe the effect dispersion has on wins.  The 
best amount of salary dispersion, in terms of gen-
erating wins, is the maximum amount possible giv-
en the salary constraints.  Model 2’s results predict 
that for every increase of one to the dispersion 
factor of a team, the team will win 7.693 more 
games.
B. Revenue Regression
 Two different regressions need to be com-
pleted in order to understand the effect salary 
dispersion within a team has on team revenue. 
Table 3 presents the results of the two OLS regres-
sions.
 In Model 1, all explanatory variables are 
utilized.  All of the explanatory variables also have 
the expected positive or negative effect that was 
assumed from the empirical model.  All of the 
variables besides the dispersion factor and the 
dispersion factor squared are significant.  With 
the dispersion variables being insignificant, the 
“best” amount of salary distribution for a revenue 
maximizing team cannot be predicted.  This result 
means, according to this model, that salary dis-
persion does not affect revenue. 
 In an attempt to improve the significance 
and deal with the insignificant parabolic curve of 
Model 1, Model 2 is completed.  The explanatory 
variables in Model 2 include all but the dispersion 
factor squared variable.  This creates the curve 
to now be linear, in comparison to the parabolic 
curve from Model 1.  With a linear curve, a spe-
cific “best” amount of dispersion cannot be inter-
preted, but instead, the “best” amount will occur 
at either no dispersion or maximum dispersion de-
pending on whether the linear function is upward 
sloping or downward sloping.
 
 The dispersion factor in Model 2 contains 
the opposite effect of what theoretically makes 
sense and is also insignificant once again.  The 
dispersion factor carries a negative effect on rev-
enue according to Model 2.  Based on the theory 
presented earlier, one would expect the oppo-
site to be true as a result of higher dispersions oc-
curring from a higher number of superstars on a 
team, which is supposed to lead to an increase 
in fan fare and thus revenue.  The negative effect 
found is statistically insignificant, however, which 
makes it somewhat irrelevant to the discussion.  
Every other explanatory variable in Model 2 is sig-
nificant with the size of the market and luxury tax 
dummy variable significant at the .01 level, the 
fixed effect variable for the 2008-09 season sig-
nificant at the .05 level, and the fixed effect vari-
ables for the seasons of 2006-07 and 2007-08 sig-
nificant at the .10 level. The fixed effect variables 
are reported in comparison to the omitted fixed 
effect variable of the 2009-10 season.
 For every 1,000,000 people in a mar-
ket, an NBA’s team revenue would increase by 
$6,753,000.  In terms of the mean market size of 
2,350,181 people, the size of the market would 
have a direct positive impact of $15,870,772.29 on 
revenue.  The coefficient for the luxury tax dummy 
variable reports that a team will earn $33,340,000 
more in revenue if a team’s total salary is above 
the luxury tax level compared to teams with a to-
tal salary that is below the luxury tax level.  The 
fixed effects variables, which are less significant 
than the market and luxury tax dummy variable, 
display that a team would generate an extra 
$12,550,000; $13,200,000; and $14,820,000 during 
the 2006-07, 2007-08, and 2008-09 seasons respec-
tively in comparison to the 2009-10 season.  This 
can be the result of many different circumstanc-
es.  The fixed effect variables are included to con-
trol for any possible omitted variable bias, and the 
fact that these variables are significant to the re-
gression proves that there are other explanatory 
variables that revenue depends on during these 
years.
 The biggest result taken away from these 
two Models is that it is not possible to determine 
a “best” amount of salary dispersion for revenue 
maximizing teams because the dispersion fac-
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tor is insignificant in both models.  In addition to 
this, despite the statistically insignificant result, the 
negative effect the dispersion factor is found to 
have on revenue in Model 2 is opposite of the hy-
pothesis that was generated from relevant eco-
nomic theory.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
 The relatively new phenomenon of large 
disparities in salary among an NBA team has al-
lowed a number of studies to be completed to 
test the effect that salary dispersion has on an or-
ganization.  The aim of this study was to determine 
the “best” amount of salary dispersion for both a 
win maximizing NBA team and a revenue maxi-
mizing NBA team.  Using data from the 2006-07 
season to the 2010-11 season, two empirical mod-
els were constructed that could help determine 
the “best” amount of dispersion for both types of 
teams.  
 It is interesting to discover, however, that 
after these models were tested, a specific “best” 
amount of salary dispersion is not able to be de-
termined from the results.  Despite this, the effect 
salary dispersion has on the number of wins a 
team achieves and amount of revenue a team 
generates is able to be determined.  Based on 
the results of this study, the dispersion factor has 
a significant positive effect on the number of wins 
a team achieves throughout a season.  This rela-
tionship suggests that the “best” amount of salary 
dispersion is the maximum amount of dispersion 
possible given the salary constraints a team faces. 
The results also indicate that the dispersion factor 
has a negative but statistically insignificant effect 
on the amount of revenue a team achieves.  As 
a result of the insignificance, there does not seem 
to be an optimal level of salary dispersion for gen-
erating revenue.  Both of these results are in con-
tradiction to previous literature.  
 Berri and Jewell (2004) performed a study 
in an attempt to relate salary dispersion and the 
number of wins an NBA team achieves.  They 
found there to be no significance between the 
amount of salary dispersion on a team and num-
ber of wins.  Their definition of dispersion was 
based on the standard deviation of the Herfind-
ahl-Hirschman Index, which is a different definition 
than employed by this study, which could be the 
reason for the difference in results.  
 Katayama and Nuch (2011) also complet-
ed a study attempting to relate the salary disper-
sion among an NBA team and the number of wins 
achieved.  They tested three different dispersion 
levels (players participating in every game for a 
given team, players participating in at least half 
of the games for a given team, and every player 
on payroll for a given team) and found salary dis-
persion to have no significant effect on the num-
ber of wins a team achieves.  Once again, the 
definition of dispersion differed from Katayama 
and Nuch’s study to this study.  
 Hausman and Leonard (1997) executed 
a study to determine if superstars in the NBA in-
crease their team’s total revenue.  They found 
superstars to have a high positive effect on total 
team revenue.  The study just completed does 
not necessarily look at superstars specifically and 
their effect on revenue, but instead, the effect 
salary dispersion has on team revenue.  Built into 
the dispersion factor variable, however, is the ef-
fect a superstar should carry.  Teams with more 
superstars will have a higher dispersion factor, 
and therefore, if superstars did affect revenues 
positively, the dispersion factor would have a sig-
nificant positive effect on revenue.  The fact that 
the dispersion factor does not have a significant 
effect on team revenue alludes to the idea that 
superstars do not have a significant effect on 
revenues, which is in complete contradiction to 
Hausman and Leonard’s study.  Hausman and 
Leonard’s study, however, took place during 
the time period of the NBA where there was no 
maximum salary for players, which is not the case 
for the study that was just completed here.  Ac-
cording to Rosen and Oi (1981, 2008) part of the 
reason people are attracted to superstars is the 
extreme amount of money they receive.  If this is 
in fact true, it is possible that setting a maximum 
salary for an individual player does not allow fans 
to reach their highest level of intrigue and there-
fore provide less revenue to the firm.
 Whatever the reasons may be, both the 
findings for the effect salary dispersion has on wins 
and the effect/absence of effect it has on reve-
nue are in complete contradiction to the previous 
literature.  
 Based off the results from this study, an 
NBA team that wants to maximize wins should 
try to acquire as many superstars as possible and 
then fill the remaining spots on their roster with low 
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salary players.  This seems to show that there must 
not be that great of a drop-off in talent level of 
the lower salaried players in the league and the 
middle salaried players.  The greater the amount 
of dispersion, the better in terms of number of 
wins, but that does not mean general managers 
should create dispersion for the purpose of creat-
ing it.  Players still need to be paid the value they 
bring to the team, but for a win maximizing team, 
general managers should get as many high-
skilled, and therefore high-paid, players signed 
to their team as possible and then complete the 
roster with low-paid players instead of signing all 
middle-value players. Those teams that are most 
successful at signing superstars will have the most 
success.
 This result can be connected back to the 
competitive imbalance problem that exists in the 
NBA today.  The fact that greater salary disper-
sion leads to greater number of wins suggests one 
reason for the competitive imbalance problem. 
As already noted, teams most successful at sign-
ing superstars will have the most success on the 
court.  With superstars in limited supply and the 
NBA instituting a soft salary cap with many excep-
tions to the rule, certain teams are presented the 
opportunity to become more successful in signing 
superstars.  These teams that are able to do so will 
dominate the league in terms of number of wins. 
As noted earlier, these results might be able to be 
translated into other fields of business.  Based on 
these results, it is possible that in some business 
environments where team performance is im-
portant, like it is in the NBA, managers may ben-
efit from hiring as many top notch employees at 
each respective job and then hire lower skilled or 
cheaper workers to round out the company in or-
der to possibly increase performance.
 In terms of policy implications of salary 
dispersion and revenues, no conclusions can be 
drawn from this study.  With salary dispersion hav-
ing no significant effect on revenue it is impossible 
to state what an NBA team or outside firm should 
strive to do in terms of salary dispersion to gener-
ate the most revenue.
 Further research should be conducted on 
this topic to clarify the effect salary dispersion has 
on firm performance and generating revenue. 
The simple fact that this study contradicts many 
before it represents the need to further explore 
and understand the relationship that exists be-
tween these factors.  One possible way to further 
explore this research is to create different defini-
tions of salary dispersion and test each one.  The 
way dispersion is calculated may have a signifi-
cant impact on the effect it has on both perfor-
mance and revenue.  With a better and more 
complete understanding of how salary disper-
sion affects firm performance and revenue, NBA 
teams and possibly other companies will be able 
to construct their teams/companies more appro-
priately.
REFERENCES
Berri, David, and Todd Jewell. “Wage Inequality 
and Firm Performance: Professional Basketball’s 
Natural Experiment.” Atlantic Economic Journal 
32.2 (2004): 130-39. Web 
Coon, Larry. “NBA Salary Cap FAQ.” 2011. Web. 
Sept. 2011. <http://members.cox.net/lmcoon/
salarycap.htm>. 
Dosh, Kristi. “Want to Repair the NBA? Start With 
Revenue Sharing. - Forbes.” Information for  the 
World’s Business Leaders - Forbes.com. Forbes, 
09 Aug. 2011. Web. 20 Nov. 2011. <http://www.
forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/08/09/want-
to-repair-the-nba-start-with-revenue-sharing/>.
Hausman, Jerry, and Gregory Leonard. “Super-
stars in the National Basketball Association: Eco-
nomic Value and Policy.” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 15.4 (1997): 586-624. JSTOR. Web. Sept. 
2011. 
Katayama, Hajime, and Hudan Nuch. “A Game-
Level Analysis of Salary Dispersion and Team Per-
formance in the National Basketball Association.” 
Applied Economics 43.10-12 (2011): 1193-1207. 
EconLit. EBSCO. Web. 21 Sept. 2011. 
Késenne, Stefan. The Economic Theory of Profes-
sional Team Sports: an Analytical Treatment. Chel-
tenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007. Print.
“Local Television Market Universe Estimates.” 
Nielsen. Web. 10 Oct. 2011. <http://www.nielson.
com/content>.
“National Basketball Association Salaries.” USA To-
day. Web. Sept. 2011. <http://content.usatoday.
com/sportsdata/basketball/nba/salaries/team>. 
Schouten
The Park Place Economist, Volume XX
84
“NBA.com.” NBA. Web. 15 Oct. 2011. <http://
www.nba.com/home/index.html>.
Oi, Walter. “Superstars, Economics of.” The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. 2008. 
Web. Sept. 2011. 
Rosen, Sherwin, and Allen Sanderson. “Labor Mar-
kets in Professional Sports.” Journal of Economic 
Literature (2000). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. Web. Sept. 2011 
Rosen, Sherwin. “Human Capital.” The New Pal-
grave Dictionary of Economics Online. 2008. Web. 
Sept. 2011. 
Rosen, Sherwin. “The Economics of Superstars.” 
The American Economic Review. JSTOR, Dec. 
1981. Web. Sept. 2011 
“The Business Of Basketball.” Information for the 
World’s Business Leaders - Forbes.com. Forbes, 
26 Jan. 2011. Web. 13 Nov. 2011. <http://www.
forbes.com/lists/2011/32/basketball-valuations_
land.html>.
